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1. Introduction
The auther thinks that large markets are intrinstcally statistical
Therefore it is meaningful to study the stutistical properties of large
markets. In this note we deal statistically with the problem of how
to find (or construct) the blocking coalitions, i. e., when a Pareto op-
timal allocation and an arbitrary confidence level are given,, how to
find (or construct) a blocking coalition under this probability (stat-
istical estimation). Seveval authors have dealt with this problem def-
initely (for example [2], [6]).
The problem of this note can be interpreted as: "How many block-
ing coalitions are there among the coalitions that are constructed by
a given procedure?" Therefore this is a variety of the problem
"How many blocking coalitions are there?" (where no procedure is
given) [4]. The theorem of this note is a version of the Core Equiv-
alence Theorem.
In this note, we deal with a special case where the preference sets
are convex and smooth. In the succeeding note [5], we deal with a
general case where it is possible that the preference sets are not con-
vex, nor smooth.
2. Model and result
The consumption set is P=R++. The space of convex and mon-
otone C2 preference relation on P satisfying the boundary condition,
'forevery x e P, jy e P : y S x| is closed in Re,' isdenoted8-
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We assume that there exists {J > 0 such that for every point xER!t, 
there is a function Q(x)ER!t'such that IQ(x)-x 1= {J and for y: I y-Q(x)1 
~(J:l, y? x [1]. 
An economy £. is a map £. : I ~ 8 X P where I is a finite in-
dexing set : S (i) is denoted C~i, Wi). Given an economy S an allocation 
is a map x : I ~ P with 2iEl x(i) ~ 2iEI W i' Given an allocation x 
tor S, one says that x is blocked by coalition Cel if C =F ¢ and there 
is x': C ~ P such that 2iEC x' (i) ~ 2 iEC wi and x' (i) >i x(i) for every 
iEC: x is Pareto optimal 'if it is not blocked by I. 
For given S let x : I ~ P be Pareto optimal. Then there is a price 
vector p such that p >0, I pi = 1 and p. (y-x(i»~O for y : y >i x(i) and 
icl, and if each indiference hypersurface ly : y~x(i)l has a tangent 
sphere at x(i), there exists only one pice vector. 
We use the following assumptions. 
Assumptions: 
1. There exists s >0 such that s> I wi I and s> I x(i) I, icl. 
2. x : I ~ p is Pareto optimal. 
3. Let 10= licl : p. (wi-':'x(i»>OI. #1 and #10 are sufficiently large. 
4. In some way C=2ido p. (wi-x(i»/ # 10 is known. 
Theorem: Under Assumptions 1-4, 1>1" >0 is given. Then there 
exist integer M, N, n and a procedure such that, 
Procedure: 
Step 1: pick up N agencies from I at random. 
N is the set of these agenc~es. If # (N ,,10) ~ n, this step holds. 
Then pick up n agencies from Nnlo at random. n is the set of 
these agencies. If # (N"lo) < n, this step does not hold. 
Step 2: pick up M agenCies from 1-N at random. 
The probability that the step 1 holds and MUD is a blocking coali-
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tion is greater than or equal to y. 
3. Proof of the theorem 
3. 1. Lemma: If- l<aj<l, iEI and Ijd aj=O, then for O<t<l 
2* P
r 
11 a I >tl~2e-2nt . 
where IT 
random. 
and IT is a set of n integers picked up from I at 
Proof: See [3], tho 1. 
3. 2. Proof of the theorem: Let '0= 1-(1- 1')/3. Then 
1- 1'=3(1- Yo). (1) 
( I) Let nl be an integer such that 
:1:J:IO>nl ~(8s2 / c2) log I! Yo (2) 
From Assumption 3, there exists such integer. 
Then 
(3) 
fi l is the set of nl agencies picked up from 10 at random. Then from 
Assumption 1, 4 and the lemma, Pr[3c/4s> -2





where [ ] is the Gauss' notation and k is a positive integer. 
* There is more precise inequalties than this. 
Nevertheless we use this inequality for simplicity. 
102 KEIEI TO KEIZAI 
Let a=+(t- 0s2+(t-C/2)2) Then a>O, (See Figur,e) 
In Figure, OA=OE=t, AB=c/2, BC=c, BD=s, DE=2a where 
FG is the distance between points F and G. 
Let nz be an integer such that 
n 2 2£s
Z
t log ~ 
2- paZ I-yo (5) 
Then 
t a/2s z 




Let 11 is a subset of I with sufficiently many elements. From 
-. t 
Assumption 3, there exists such subset. Let N z be the set of nz( Ii) 
- LiEN2 xij h integers picked up from I at random. Let x.j '-'"' were 
#Nz 
xi =wi-x(i), iEll and xij=j-component of xi, and let ,u.j=( #\1)17idlXij, 
j =1, ... ,£. 
Then from the lemma and '(6), 
Pr {I x
2
·j - 2,u·j I:S: a/2
t
s , j = 1 , .... , Q 1 
s s' - ve(-) 
p 
~1-2£ exp {-2nz(t/p) ( a/2s )zl ~Yo (7) 





(III) Let N be an integer such that 
(:I:tIO) (#(1-10)) 
u N-u --.,. 2 ----''""---.=....:...---=---.= Yo 
u~n (~l) 
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(V) Now 1'1 be the set of any N agencies picked up from 1 at ran-
dom, and set 11=I-N. Then, by (11), 
1,uI<a/2 (12) 
where 
Z11 xi . 
,u #1' 1. e., ,u=(,u.1, ,u.£). 
(VI) From Assumption 3, the lemma, (2), (3), (4), and (8), we can sub-
stitute n for nl in (4). Similarly, from Assumption 3, the lemma, (5), 
(6), (7) and (8), we can substitute n for nz in (7). Therefore, from (1), 
(9), (10) and (12), the theorem holds. 
College of Commerce, Nagasaki University 
Katafuchi, Nagasaki, Japan 
References. 
[1] Debrew, G., "The rate of convergence of the core of an economy", Journal 
of Mathematical Economices, 2(1975), 1-7. 
[2] Dierker, E., "Gains and losses at core allocations", Journal of Mathematical 
Economics, 2(1975), 119·128. 
[3] Hoeffding, W., "Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random vari-
ables", Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(1963), 13·30. 
[4] Mas-Colell, A., "A note on the core,equivalence theorem: How many blocking 
coalitions are there ?", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 5(1978), 207-215. 
[5] Okuda, H., "Statistical estimation and blocking coalitions, II." Forthcomming. 
[6] Vind, K., "A theorem on the core of an economy," Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 32(1965), 47-48. 
